Options "First refusals" for the coping "mastering" of a dilemma "quandary" from European view "sight"
Consequences of a possible EU accession
Controversial debate "discussion" around the accession
The debate "discussion" on a possible EU accession of Turkey followed up to now controversially with the help of different argumentation lines. Proteams and contrateams are found in all member states and pass over political party borders. The debate "discussion" around the accession of Turkey has developed phase-wise to a " fissure mushroom of Europe ". After the decision from December, 2004, in October, 2005 them
To begin negotiations, Turkey is apparently in a "Luftholphase". However, some mean "think", Turkey is "in the "euro Blüs". One may assume from the fact that Ankara will record European journey "drive", must becomes record.
Central questions in the present "previous" debate "discussion" are, above all, as the European identity is determinable where the borders of Europe lie whether Turkey should join basically to the EU and can and whether this one strategical increase signifies. Besides it was discussed over and over again which alternatives have both pages and which consequences are to be derived "deduced" from it.
For the present "available" contribution the following questions serve as a guideline:
* 1. how the accession ability of Turkey in the EU can be assessed?
* 2. how the state quo is recordably and estimateable?
* 3. which alternatives arise "surrender" for Europe and for Turkey?
* 4. which consequences can be derived "deduced" for both "players" in each case?
Destinations are a differentiated, about the " Copenhagen criteria " exceeding "going beyond" evaluation of the accession ability, a representation of alternatives to the full membership and the clear lapping of possible consequences from geopolitical view "sight" if Turkey joins to the EU as a full member or does not do this. 1
If Turkey fulfils them
" Copenhagen criteria "?
Turkey will need in spite of noteworthy progress still substantial time to fulfil the " Copenhagen criteria ". It is unlikely that Turkey fulfils the political criteria in spite of big "great" efforts up to the autumn, 2005. To assess whether with Turkey the admission "intake" of negotiations can follow, is to be made a distinction between the political one and the economic accession criteria.
While the economic criteria should be realized only by the accession completely, the political criteria must be fulfilled - like with all present "previous" extensions - already to a great extent.
A divergence of this basic principle "rationale" is to be assessed as a far-reaching decision with Präzedenzcharakter. An example effect for other prospective customers "interested parties" in an EU-full membership is not to be excluded "expelled" (e.g., Croatia, the Ukraine, Russia, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, etc.). Whether this was considered by the decision in December, 2004, may be doubted. The Verwässerung of the " Copenhagen criteria " would be fatal for the EU, because it would deprive herself of all standards.
From the EU commission for 2004 installed list of the Turkish deficits was so extensive that a sufficient "an enough" level of democratic structures and middle-class "civil" rights "laws" seemed accessible till the end of 2004 barely - and, nevertheless, the findings of the commission were positive limiting. One recommended to the council "councillor" the admission "intake" of negotiations of accession under observance of certain controlling mechanisms. In the end "finally", the decision of the commission is an expression "printout" of a dilemma "quandary" in which the union was since middle of the nineties; from this time one had pushed open "had postponed" the decision over and over again. Now one could no more but and had to act under big "great" printing - again without concrete strategy.
Besides, the problems of Turkey lay less at the lawful level, but rather in the practical realization "implementation". Turkey has an extreme conversion deficit (a voucher for it "in return" is in the 3/31/2005 now again a postponed criminal law reform). Because the EU will barely dilute her "their" own democratic principles, is to be counted on protracted negotiations. They will require more time than the negotiations with the eastern neighboring countries. There was anchored the sociopolitical basic consensus of European values - also in view of grievous experiences with the communism - broadly. Turkey will accept no mock battles for the purpose "targets" of the delay of the accession and the EU cannot afford those also at all.
Does Turkey fulfil the economic criteria?
Also the fulfilment of the economic criteria (i. e. the functioning market economy) will still take up many years.
The fulfilment of the economic criteria is not a requirement for the admission "intake" of the negotiations, however, essential steps should have followed in this direction. This can show Turkey. She "it" has initiated after several economic crises promising and from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported reforms and is only a little worse in many areas than to assess Bulgaria and Romania. If the reform process is strictly continued, the economic criteria in a temporal perspective of ten years might display "show" no barrier for an EU accession of Turkey.
This causes that no farther "further" crisis hinders the economic recreational process, delays or zunichte does "makes". Also with a positive economic development the economic distance "spacing" remains between Turkey and the current "present" EU exist "consist". This counts "applies" for the rest also to the other named states. Over and over again adaptation periods from 25 to 30 years are called "mentioned". Out of this arise "surrender" the far-reaching consequences which can determine "stipulate" the negotiations course (demand for extensive transitional regulations), the time and the Modalitäten (special regulations by the integration in the EU policy) of the accession.
A possible accession raises "increases"
the reform printing
The following factors "administrators" are barely found in official "formal" EU documents, nevertheless, are to be found over and over again in various expert's assessments. They give a differentiated insight into the strategical sequences for the EU and should find absolutely entrance in the assessment.
The increasing Heterogenität of the union strengthens the demand for a breathing space and consolidation. The likewise rising economic Heterogenität of the advanced union displays "shows" immense challenges to her "their" internal coherence and the coordination of her "their" policy areas. An EU membership of Turkey raises "increases" the printing on reforms of the European agricultural policy and structure policy further and could also lead to a failure of this area. In particular all reforms rather successful up to now of the European agrarian area would be loaded by an accession of Turkey once more.
Because Poland as well as Hungary (late Romania and Bulgaria) farm surpluses produce and bind the agrarian structures (subsidies "subventions", surface pool, cooperatives etc.) already now a large part of the whole "complete" EU budgets, is not conceivable as Turkey could contribute causing full member to a discharge of the EU budgets as farther "further" worry. It remains unclear who is ready "idle" for the Turkish subsidy demands in the agrarian area and is able to arise. In addition "beyond it", it would come "get" to another wave "of the "farm death" in Western Europe and Central Europe. Alone the accession of Poland already leads to a barely portable Überbeanspruchung of the relevant budgets. Farther "further" demands will be also enforcable in the European general public "publicity" no more.
The migration potential of Turkey is considerable and would drag the compulsion for long-term transitional regulations after itself by an accession. This migration would be to be caught from all member states, in particular, however, from those which can show a soaring economic performance. At the same time is
to question "scrutinize" the qualification "skill" of Turkish employees, because the less certified employees will tend rather to the migration. However, these often show a distinctive job will on and are ready "idle" to take over activities "operations" which are refused otherwise. For the east extension a long-term migration potential of 3% to 8% of the population of the origin countries was estimated "guessed" according to estimate.
For Turkey an additional migration potential (under deduction "discount" signifies analogously in 2013 him already in Germany living Turkish population) between 0.5 to 4.4 million people. This wandering movement, besides is favoured by existing networks of the Turkish population living in Germany (including the established approx. 2.5 Mil.). In particular persons from Anatolia and country areas "fields" have a disproportionate high interest in the Turkish population in Germany. These will not be justified only by the job market problems, but on account of the integration problems of shares "parts" of the Turkish population in Germany which are reflected, among the rest, in a disproportionate high unemployed installment.
Also other states would be concerned by it. So also Austria, because according to experience to Germany migrated Turks walk in a not unsubstantial magnitude "dimensions" to Austria further. Indeed, Turkish immigrants have - in contrast to immigrants from the new EU states - the trend to remain in the host country. Begründbar is this with the big "great" differences in the quality of life and the economic possibilities between the host country and Turkey. In addition "beyond it", the integration readiness is rather low "small". Rather one tries to attach himself to the already resident clan and forms "establishes" thus itself separated "delimited" islands "isles" in the host country. Because the social situation "position" does not come up in these islands "isles" also to that of the host country, these structures are at least a potential for radical ideas (e.g., the "caliphate state" in Cologne; " Gray wolves " 2 in Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg and Vienna).
Consequences on the institution structure of the EU
The membership of Turkey will have considerable back effects on the internal decision processes of the EU which strengthen position of the new members and the cohesion states. As a sequence of the EU extensions the political power balance of the union moves in favour of the cohesion countries (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Greece). In EU-15 their "her" meaning (Spain, Portugal and Greece) is relatively low "small", although they are represented "substituted" by the European council "councillor" disproportionate. Because almost all accession countries are relatively poor in comparison to the EU, the meaning of the cohesion countries will clearly grow by the first east extension. They will unite approx. 30% of the population, however, 36% of the parliament and even "still" 42% of the council voices on themselves, reach "arrive", however, only approx. 14% of the gross domestic product (BIP) of the EU. Indeed, with the extension including Turkey the weighty EU land of Spain falls out on account of the slightest income level from this team what is overcompensated, nevertheless, by the countries coming anew of Bulgaria, Romania and, above all, by Turkey. Turkey would have as a second largest EU state - measured in the population - an analogous leverage like Germany. Then the cohesion countries will unite an interest of 36% in the population, 41% of the parliament voices and 43% of the council voices with a BIP interest of only approx. 9% on themselves.
The voltage field Modern age - tradition
Turkey brings along a strong voltage field between tradition and modern age in the social development. The Osmanische company was an elite company and this elite formed "established" only one very narrow shift. A middle-class "civil" company could not develop, because there were not the requirements necessary for it. The economic basis was not existent. Trade "commerce" was by the majority in Greek and Armenian hand. Osmanischen and later also the Turkish elites acting in the management and in the military. The Kemalismus should bring here a turn. In the end "finally", however, this ideology was concentrated again "on the other hand" on in the Osmanischen empire to represented elites. The country population could start "begin" only very little the Kemalismus. The discussion "analysis" between Kemalisten and sales representatives of a modern, moderate version drags itself by the whole "complete" Turkish history. In addition "Beyond it", are not many developments which stamped Europe Turkey either absolutely strange or, however, with the Eigenperzeption compatibly. Just of this unsolved Spannungs feld is to be seen as a " hidden integration problem ".
2.) the " Federation of the Turkish democratic idealist's associations in Europe e. V. " ("Avrupa Demokratik-Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu"/ADÜTDF) was founded in 1978 in Frankfurt am Main and is the Turkish organization best-known in Germany with an extremely nationalistic trend. Of the wide general public "publicity" the ADÜTDF is known, above all, under the name "denomination" " gray wolves
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